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Sieges and Ceasefires in Syria’s Civil War 
Lessons Learned as Regional Players Undermine New Approach by UN Mediator 
Khaled Yacoub Oweis 
Representatives of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People, an international alliance 
that nominally supports the Syrian opposition, met in Berlin in March 2015 on the fourth 
anniversary of the Syrian revolt. Participants in the meeting discussed ways to revive 
the mission of UN mediator Staffan de Mistura, whose efforts for achieving a ceasefire 
in Aleppo – Syria’s former commercial and industrial hub – have gone nowhere. Ger-
many has been particularly supportive of de Mistura. But the main players in Syria and 
their regional supporters have shown little willingness to curb the violence, as the con-
flict, together with Yemen, is at the heart of what is increasingly perceived as a Sunni-
Shia schism. Germany is committed to finding a political solution in Syria that addresses 
the regional dimension of the conflict. But this is unlikely to happen without a thaw 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia that would allow for tackling sticky political issues 
behind the religious rhetoric. 
 
Mounting tensions between Arab Gulf coun-
tries and Iran have hardened the positions 
of the main players in Syria, thus lessening 
their willingness to negotiate a solution to 
the conflict and undermining the mission 
of Staffan de Mistura, the Special UN envoy. 
Syria has also appeared to drop from the 
list of US priorities, as the Obama adminis-
tration has concentrated on military action 
against the so-called Islamic State (IS) in 
Iraq and on reaching a deal with Iran over 
Tehran’s nuclear program. 
Seeing little chance to convene another 
international peace conference following 
the collapse of the US- and Russia-sponsored 
“Geneva II” talks in February 2014, de Mis-
tura pursued a ground-up approach aimed 
at establishing ceasefires and “freeze zones” 
in certain areas, starting in the northern 
city of Aleppo. The Aleppo effort was to dif-
fer from previous ceasefires, which were 
reached mostly with little UN involvement, 
in that past deals concerned areas besieged 
by President Bashar al-Assad’s regime and 
resulted in de facto rebel surrender. 
Regional Tension Muddies Efforts 
Aleppo’s historic importance and the huge 
devastation it has incurred presented the 
city as a high-profile test case for de Mis-
tura’s approach and a potential model for 
other hotspots in Syria. For months, de 
Mistura met Assad and his lieutenants to 
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talk about Aleppo, as well as foreign powers 
that included Turkey, Iran, and Russia. De 
Mistura also met the Shamiya (Levant) Front, 
a grouping of mostly jihadist rebel brigades 
in Aleppo, which coordinated with the al-
Qaeda-linked Nusra Front, the most formi-
dable anti-Assad formation in the north. 
But outside powers contributed to rais-
ing the stakes on the ground and the talks 
achieved little. In February 2015, Assad’s 
forces, backed by the Lebanese group Hez-
bollah and other Shiite militias, mounted 
a major offensive to seal off Aleppo – at the 
same time that de Mistura was in New York 
briefing the Security Council on his mis-
sion. In southern Syria, Hezbollah appeared 
to take the lead in a simultaneous offensive 
aimed at recapturing, on behalf of the 
Assad regime, strategic military positions 
lost to the Nusra Front as well as Arab- and 
Western-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) bri-
gades near the border with Jordan and the 
Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Jordan and 
Arab Gulf countries regarded the attacks as 
being a major escalation driven by Iran. In 
reaction – and reversing a period of appar-
ent neglect of the rebels – the passage of 
weapons to anti-Assad forces through Tur-
key and Jordan increased, helping to repel 
the offensives. Progress on a nuclear deal 
between Washington and Tehran also 
added to regional worries about the Islamic 
Republic, with Arab Sunni monarchies 
regarding the deal as a catalyst for what 
they view as Iranian expansionism. But 
some in the Obama administration hope 
that a nuclear agreement will usher in a 
period of cooperation with Iran on solving 
Syrian as well as other regional problems. 
Aleppo Dynamics 
Prior to de Mistura’s focus on Aleppo, 
several ceasefires, which the regime calls 
“local reconciliations,” were reached in 
besieged Sunni neighborhoods, for example 
in Damascus and Homs. As a result, some 
aid has been allowed in, but the situation 
has remained short of conciliatory. Pro-
Assad forces were left ringing the areas, 
controlling food and basic supplies, and 
they remained free to mount incursions. 
Hundreds of fighters, who laid down their 
arms, as well as activists and civilians who 
were supposed to be spared were killed, 
imprisoned, or disappeared, such as in 
the al-Qadam neighborhood of southern 
Damascus, and in Mouaddamiya on the 
western edge of the capital. 
The situation differs fundamentally in 
Aleppo from other areas where rebel bri-
gades agreed to ceasefires under duress, 
in that Aleppo has not been completely 
besieged by Assad’s forces. The city, whose 
population was around three million before 
the revolt, has been roughly split into a 
western part under the control of the Assad 
regime and an eastern sector held by anti-
Assad brigades. Eastern districts were poorer 
and contained most of the city’s inhabit-
ants. Their numbers swelled in the decade 
before the revolt due to migration from 
the countryside and from areas along the 
Euphrates River basin in eastern Syria hit 
by a water crisis and near famine. But only 
40,000 people or so have remained in east-
ern Aleppo, large areas of which have been 
pulverized by regime “barrel bombs” and 
other weapons. Regime-held parts of the 
city have fared better and retained a much 
larger population because the relative lack 
of firepower by the rebels has meant less 
destruction on this side. Thousands of 
families from eastern neighborhoods have 
also found refuge from the fighting and 
bombardment in western Aleppo. 
In February 2015, regime regulars and 
allied militia backed by Hezbollah tried to 
build on their firepower advantage and seal 
off the city. They mounted an offensive to 
take Castello Road, the only route leading 
in and out of Aleppo still under the control 
of the anti-Assad brigades in the northern 
sector. Pro-Assad forces first took the adja-
cent town of Ratyan and executed 48 people, 
mostly civilians. Instead of softening 
Aleppo’s defenses, many residents in rebel-
held eastern Aleppo saw the massacre as a 
sectarian onslaught and an Iranian attempt 
to capture Aleppo. This helped galvanize the 
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eastern neighborhoods’ defenses and raised 
support for jihadist brigades marketing 
themselves as a bastion of Sunni resistance. 
Islamist militancy in Aleppo had already 
risen after the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq 
through the recruitment of jihadists from 
the city – apparently with tacit support 
from the Syrian security apparatus – to 
fight in Iraq. In 2007 a cleric known as Mah-
moud Abu al-Qaqa, suspected of recruiting 
young jihadists in Aleppo to fight in Iraq, 
was assassinated in the city. The killing 
occurred at the same time the Assad regime 
began, under US pressure, to make public 
commitments to stop the flow of jihadists 
to Iraq and imprison jihadists upon their 
return to Syria. Yet, the authorities released 
most of the jihadists a few months after the 
revolt against Assad family rule broke out 
in March 2011, helping radicalize the upris-
ing. A cycle of cooperation and crackdown 
involving the regime and Islamists ap-
peared to break down for good after the 
beginning of the revolt. Militant Islamists, 
such as the Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham, 
became the most formidable adversaries of 
Assad, especially in Aleppo and the neigh-
boring agricultural province of Idlib. But 
Aleppo’s Sunni merchant class has largely 
remained allied with the minority Alawite 
regime against the rebels rooted in poorer 
parts of the city and in the countryside. 
The jihadists have overpowered most 
of the FSA brigades in northern Syria. By 
March 2015, attacks by the Nusra Front 
forced the Hazm Movement – an FSA bri-
gade that received Western backing and 
boasted an arsenal of anti-tank missiles – 
to dissolve. Four months earlier, leaders of 
the Syria Revolutionary Front, an FSA unit 
linked with Saudi Arabia, fled to Turkey 
after the Nusra Front overran their posi-
tions in northern Syria. The two FSA units 
did not help their cause by developing a 
reputation for graft and timidity in con-
frontations with the regime. 
Pro-Assad forces were driven back 
from Ratyan in February 2015 and a major 
attempt to completely besiege eastern 
Aleppo failed. Fighting in and around the 
city appeared to settle back into a pro-
longed war of attrition. In March 2015, the 
Association of the Forces of the Revolution 
in Aleppo, an amalgamation of civilian and 
military units that included the Shamiya 
Front, rejected de Mistura’s ceasefire pro-
posals at a meeting in the Turkish town of 
Kilis near the Syrian border. By that time, 
de Mistura was pursuing a modest deal the 
regime indicated it might accept. It cen-
tered on a ceasefire in one contested neigh-
borhood rather than the whole of the city 
and a six-week halt in regime barrel bomb-
ings, as well as anti-Assad forces stopping 
the use of “hell cannons,” which are im-
provised gas cylinder bombs fired at regime 
neighborhoods. But following the recapture 
of Ratyan, Aleppo defenders were embold-
ened and stepped up their efforts to encircle 
the Shiite towns of Zahraa and Nubul, 20 
kilometers north of Aleppo. The two towns 
have been main recruiting grounds for 
regime irregulars in the north, but the 
towns were not sealed off during the siege. 
Supplies of food and other goods have con-
tinued to reach Zahraa and Nubul from 
Ifrin, a nearby Kurdish enclave. The regime 
also reached the town by air. Thus, fighting 
has continued in Aleppo and its rural en-
virons. By mid-April 2015, the regime had 
stepped up its barrel bombings, killing 
more than 100 people in Aleppo over a 
span of five days. This occurred after rebels 
dug tunnels and infiltrated security com-
pounds in the city and after a rebel mortar 
bomb attack killed nine people in a residen-
tial neighborhood under regime control. 
Too Many Potential Spoilers 
The continuous possibility of Aleppo 
becoming encircled by Hezbollah and the 
Assad regime has helped maintain a sem-
blance of unity among the rebels, although 
several groups left the Shamiya Front 
alliance after the Hezbollah assault was 
repelled. The Shamiya Front was eventually 
absorbed into Fatah Halab (the Conquest of 
Aleppo), a new grouping of mostly hardline 
Islamists formed in April 2015 with the aim 
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of taking the whole city from the regime, 
further undermining the possibility of a 
de-escalation of the conflict.  
Outside powers are not all necessarily 
supportive either. De Mistura’s efforts in 
Aleppo have weakened a long-standing 
Turkish call for a northern safe zone to be 
established to protect civilians, and to 
allow a provisional opposition government 
based in the southern Turkish city of 
Gaziantep to move to Syria. Without US 
backing, especially airpower, the Turkish 
proposal remains dormant. But Ankara 
appeared to signal its displeasure with de 
Mistura’s focus on the north by allowing 
rebels brigades and opposition politicians 
to meet in Kilis and denounce his Aleppo 
efforts. Among the opposition figures in 
Kilis were Khaled Khoja, the head of the 
Western and Arab-backed National Coali-
tion of Syrian Revolution and Opposition 
Forces (or: the Coalition), and Samir Nashar, 
a senior Coalition member from Aleppo. 
Both Khoja and Nashar are closely connect-
ed with Turkey. Khoja told those at the 
meeting that de Mistura’s ideas had to be 
part of an overall solution. Most members 
of the Coalition feared that the de Mistura 
plan would end up handing Aleppo to Assad, 
but several veteran opposition figures were 
dismayed by the presence of Khoja at the 
Kilis meeting. In their view, de Mistura 
lacked a strategy as a mediator, but it would 
have been more beneficial for the Coalition 
not to take the blame for the perceived 
failure of de Mistura. In contrast, the Assad 
regime played for time and showed more 
prudence by not rejecting the Aleppo pro-
posals outright, while having little interest 
in ceasefires in areas it could not control. 
Regime Takes Blow in North 
The Coalition’s mishandling of de Mistura’s 
proposals was overshadowed in late March 
2015 when Idlib city, a provincial capital, 
was taken from regime hands. The capture 
of Idlib by an alliance of mostly jihadist 
brigades, known as Jaish al-Fatah (the Army 
of Conquest), diminished the opposition’s 
appetite to compromise further. Jaish 
al-Fatah is largely comprised of the Nusra 
Front, as well as the hardline Suqour 
al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham. Its fighters 
stem largely from Idlib and wanted to return 
to their homes, but they appeared to also 
be driven by a perception that the war has 
squarely become a defense of their faith 
against – and a takeover of Syria by – Iran 
and Hezbollah. The regime accused Turkey 
of aiding the takeover of Idlib, ignoring 
apparent disarray in regime ranks after the 
jihadists targeted communication centers 
in the first stage of their assault on the city. 
After Idlib fell, Jaish al-Fatah captured the 
town of Jisr al-Shughour and advanced 
toward other regime positions on a major 
highway leading from Idlib to Alawite 
strongholds in the Latakia governorate. 
These developments have rendered de Mis-
tura’s efforts in the north ineffective. In 
April 2015, the UN Secretary-General asked 
de Mistura to start a new round of separate 
consultations with opposition groups, the 
regime, and outside powers with the aim of 
re-launching the political process. The con-
sultations are supposed to be guided by the 
“Geneva I” communiqué of June 2012, which 
calls for a ceasefire and a transitional govern-
ing body, that is, the approach that regime 
and opposition forces were not ready to agree 
on in the “Geneva II” talks in early 2014. 
Turning Toward Homs 
At the same time, failure in the north did 
not mean an end to de Mistura’s local cease-
fire approach. The UN envoy has also been 
trying to help conclude a ceasefire deal for 
the besieged al-Waer neighborhood, in the 
central city of Homs, Syria’s third-largest 
city. The UN’s role in another siege situa-
tion in Homs in 2014 has come under pri-
vate criticism from within the organization 
and from Western officials for over-trusting 
the Assad regime. 
Iran has also become a main player in 
Homs, which is near Shiite villages and 
Hezbollah strongholds in the Bekaa Valley, 
across the border with Lebanon. The rebel-
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lion in Homs was all but crushed when 
Assad’s forces entered the city’s old quar-
ters after two Iranian-engineered deals 
in May 2014. Pro-Assad forces have since 
tightened their hold on al-Waer, the last 
area in Homs where rebel fighters are 
present in significant numbers. The conflict 
in the city has been marked by waves of 
slaughter and carpet bombings against 
rebellious Sunni neighborhoods, as well as 
reprisal killings of Alawite civilians. After 
the violence intensified in 2012, most of 
the city’s once majority Sunni population 
fled to Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. Some 
managed to move to the regime-held areas 
of Latakia, al-Nabak, on the Damascus-Homs 
highway, and Palmyra, deep in the desert to 
the east. Also, more than 14,000 families 
from Homs neighborhoods such as Bab Amr 
and the old city have found refuge in al-
Waer. The district is situated near a rural 
Shiite region known as al-Mazraa, where 
Hezbollah militias have deployed and oper-
ated under the cover of the Assad regime’s 
heavy artillery. 
An Iranian official nicknamed Abu 
Fadi has been negotiating for months with 
al-Waer representatives about a deal to 
reestablish the regime’s presence in the 
area in return for letting in food and medi-
cine and allowing people to leave. A draft 
of a proposed agreement is vague about the 
status of those wanted by the regime, which 
has prompted opposition to the deal from 
some 2,000 fighters defending the district, 
who are mostly from al-Oqaidat, a clan 
rooted in al-Waer. But popular pressure on 
the fighters to make a deal has appeared 
to increase. Dozens of people were killed 
by regime shelling and barrel bombs in 
al-Waer in the first three months of 2015, 
including five workers at the Al-Waleed 
Hospital. The facility has been targeted by 
regime rockets several times, and only a 
few doctors have remained in the district. 
Another hospital in al-Waer is under the 
control of the regime, and arrests of patients 
are common. Four aid organizations sanc-
tioned by the regime operate in al-Waer, 
but their food storage depots are empty 
because deliveries have not been allowed 
through regime roadblocks. Bread passes 
through almost daily as well as occasional 
deliveries of perishable foods. Fuel and non-
perishable foods are not allowed, and pro-
longed electricity cuts are common. 
De Mistura and his aides have met repre-
sentatives of al-Waer to see how his mission 
could help improve the situation. De Mis-
tura’s predecessor, Lakhdar Brahimi, a dip-
lomatic stalwart, pushed for UN involve-
ment in an earlier siege situation in the old 
city of Homs while he was presiding over 
the Geneva II peace talks. At the time, the 
UN’s blessing helped seal an Iranian-
brokered deal for the partial evacuation of 
the old city. UN officials watched in Feb-
ruary 2014 as 1,150 people, many of whom 
were malnourished, left the old city over 
several days. They included at least 450 
men between the ages of 17 and 50 years 
old, which the regime regarded as males 
of fighting age and detained them upon 
their exit in the nearby Al-Andalus School, 
although they included civilians and am-
putees. Four men were killed and their 
bodies were later found; another 150 dis-
appeared. The remaining 300 men were 
freed or were forced to join the Assad army. 
In early 2015 information emerged about 
the fate of some of the 150 who went mis-
sing when an activist among them turned 
up alive. The activist was transferred from 
the makeshift detention facility in Homs to 
a secret police compound in Damascus and 
tortured. At least half of those who were 
initially held in the Al-Andalus School are 
now thought to have been killed. The rest 
were transferred to unofficial jails in Damas-
cus and their fate is unknown. 
Brahimi was warned from within his 
team that the regime was likely to violate 
the Homs deal and killings could follow. 
But he was eager for confidence-building 
measures amid the stalled Geneva talks and 
jumped on the ceasefire bandwagon. From 
February to May 2014, another 800 males 
of fighting age in the old city handed them-
selves in. The regime contacted them 
through some of the detainees who were 
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freed from the Al-Andalus School and 
offered not to harm them if they also left. 
Still, some 50 out of the 800 men eventually 
disappeared. Iran then made a push for an-
other Homs deal, partly to show the inter-
national community it could deliver in 
Syria. On 8 May 2014 the last fighters exited 
the old city to rebel areas in the country-
side north of Homs. The deal involved free-
ing Alawite captives held by rebels, which 
helped make the arrangement stick. The 
regime did not want to appear dismissive 
of its core constituency. This consideration 
appears to have been crucial for the relative 
success of one ceasefire in a Damascus dis-
trict as well. 
Damascus Neighborhoods 
Out of some 10 local ceasefires concluded 
since late 2013, the regime lacked over-
whelming advantage in only one deal. It 
was concluded in January 2014 and covered 
the mixed Barzeh neighborhood of north-
ern Damascus. Barzeh is ringed by Assad’s 
forces. Yet, the close proximity of Alawite 
and Sunni neighborhoods in Barzeh has 
meant that neither side can target the other 
with impunity. Since the deal was made, 
detentions and regime incursions into 
Barzeh have been rare, and food and basic 
supplies have been allowed in without the 
regime making demands in return. Loyalist 
and rebel checkpoints have also been set 
up at the entrances of the district near each 
other. Unlike in besieged areas, where the 
rebel arsenals have been depleted, Barzeh 
fighters have retained enough firepower to 
make life difficult for regime supporters in 
neighboring areas while still wanting safety 
for their own families. The regime also 
judged that provoking the rebels could be-
come too costly. Thus, developments such 
as those that have arisen in other ceasefire 
areas have been avoided. Following other 
ceasefires in Damascus, markets have been 
shelled. Residents have also been black-
mailed to hand over wanted people or 
allow Syrian state television to come in to 
make propaganda footage in return for 
letting in food. People were arrested when 
they went to take deliveries of basic sup-
plies, most notably in the Yarmouk Camp 
in southern Damascus, theater of several 
failed deals and sieges of the camp by Assad’s 
forces since May 2013. 
A fallout inside Yarmouk between Islam-
ist fighters culminated in the Islamic State’s 
entry into the camp in early April 2015. 
Assad’s forces intensified their indiscrimi-
nate bombardment of the area as the Islamic 
State fought, and largely expelled, a faction 
linked to the Palestinian movement Hamas 
from the camp. UN officials, including a 
deputy of de Mistura, met Syrian officials 
in Damascus to try and save 18,000 trapped 
civilians, including 3,500 children. 
Yarmouk was home to 150,000 Palestin-
ians and a large number of Syrians before 
the revolt. It was besieged as part of a 
larger siege on several interconnected rebel 
districts. These comprise Yarmouk, Hajar 
al-Aswad, which is inhabited mostly by 
refugees from the Israeli-occupied Golan 
Heights, as well as districts that have signed 
local ceasefires, including al-Qadam, Isali, 
Babila, Yalda, and Beit Sahm. The enormity 
and lengthy duration of the siege have 
helped radicalize the population and estab-
lish jihadist brigades as the main players on 
the anti-Assad side in southern Damascus. 
Since the beginning of the siege, starvation 
and malnutrition have killed an estimated 
160 people in Yarmouk. Infants were among 
the dead as a consequence of the regime’s 
“surrender or starve” strategy in Yarmouk. 
Many were newcomers who arrived to Yar-
mouk in poor health after Assad’s forces 
and Hezbollah militia overran rebel areas 
around the Shiite shrine of al-Saida Zainab, 
further south of the capital. People involved 
in delivering aid also have come under 
attack from rebel bridges in the camp. 
Palestinian factions in Yarmouk had split 
at the beginning of the revolt. The Palestine 
Liberation Organization favored neutrality, 
Hamas chose a pro-revolt approach, and the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales-
tine-General Command (PFLP-GC) remained 
pro-Assad. The PFLP-GC, however, lost popu-
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larity in Yarmouk after the group – appar-
ently acting at the behest of the Assad 
regime – encouraged hundreds of Yarmouk 
residents to protest at a fence separating 
the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights from 
the rest of Syria in June 2011. Israeli forces 
killed at least 10 protesters. PFLP-GC militia-
men then killed a dozen mourners at the 
funeral of the protesters in Yarmouk. The 
balance of power in the camp began to 
change and the PFLP-GC was expelled. In 
early 2012 an armed group called Aknaf 
Beit al-Maqdis (Aknaf) was formed in Yar-
mouk by members of Hamas who stayed 
in Syria after the Hamas leadership left 
the country. The new formation joined 
two FSA units in fighting Assad’s forces. 
In line with the wider demise of moder-
ate rebels, jihadists displaced the FSA in 
Yarmouk in 2013; thereafter the Nusra 
Front, the hardline Ahrar al-Sham, and 
Aknaf became the main players inside the 
camp. Nearby, the Islamic State drove out 
other Islamist and FSA units from Hajar 
al-Aswad. 
In a move that antagonized the Nusra 
Front, Aknaf became close with Sham 
al-Rasoul, an Islamist rebel formation based 
in the nearby districts of Yalda and Babila, 
which agreed to a ceasefire with the regime 
in 2014 and subsequently expelled the Nusra 
Front from the area. The Nusra Front there-
fore remained on the sidelines when, in 
early April 2015, the Islamic State raided 
the headquarters of Aknaf in Yarmouk. The 
attack came days after Aknaf accused the 
Islamic State of having assassinated Yihya 
al-Horani, one of its leaders, and arrested 
several Islamic State fighters who were at 
the edge of Yarmouk. Aknaf largely lost 
the battle with the Islamic State, and its 
fighters fled to regime positions ringing 
the camp. Others surrendered to the Nusra 
Front. A third group from Aknaf fled to 
Sham al-Rasoul’s enclaves in Yalda and 
Babila, along with hundreds of families 
who escaped stepped-up regime bombard-
ment on Yarmouk. 
Popular pressure has appeared to rise 
on the Nusra Front to cooperate with inter-
national efforts to spare the camp more 
carnage. In response, Nusra Front issued 
a declaration in mid-April 2015 that the 
group would protect aid entering the camp 
and deliver it to a central distribution out-
let. But chances appear dim that the regime 
would accept aid reaching Yarmouk while 
the camp is under the control of a strength-
ened Nusra Front. After defeating Aknaf, 
many Islamic State fighters apparently with-
drew from Yarmouk to their home district 
of Hajar al-Aswad, which they had left ex-
posed while pursuing Aknaf. In Yarmouk, 
the regime has intensified a “bite by bite” 
strategy, taking areas on the edge of the 
camp after heavy shelling, then flattening 
them to make sure rebels cannot return. 
Indeed, the history of Yarmouk since 
the beginning of the revolt underlines the 
lack of qualms by the regime to shell dense-
ly inhabited population centers on the one 
hand, and the difficulty of implementing 
ceasefires in areas where rebels still com-
pete for turf on the other. In mid-2014, a 
ceasefire deal entitled “neutralizing Yar-
mouk camp” was struck with the involve-
ment of the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East. But the deal did not go into effect, 
partly because of the lack of cooperation 
from the Nusra Front. A clause in the agree-
ment stipulated the exit of fighters who are 
not from Yarmouk from the camp, which 
was seen as favoring Aknaf at the expense 
of the Nusra Front. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
A more assertive posture by Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, as well as the lack of a resolution 
for Russia’s disputes with the West, will 
make a new round of international con-
sultations on Syria initiated by the UN dif-
ficult, especially as these consultations 
will be held at the same time international 
powers and Iran negotiate a final nuclear 
deal. Attentive to its Hezbollah proxy, Iran 
has played a major role in local ceasefires 
in Syria but it has shown little appetite 
for a political transition at the core of the 
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Geneva I framework. Such a transition 
could lead to a Sunni political ascendency, 
potentially undermining Hezbollah’s 
weapons supply route through Syria and 
weakening an important ally at the center 
of the Arab Middle East. Therefore, a region-
al agreement that would support local 
ceasefires with all the necessary measures 
needed to enforce them effectively remains 
unlikely. Some UN officials have argued 
that previous ceasefires in Syria have saved 
lives, but this is only true when the killings 
apparently committed by the regime are 
glossed over. Indeed, mechanisms for solv-
ing the conflict on the local level matter 
little without addressing the confrontation 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which is 
what underlies the region’s violent con-
flicts which are increasingly being perceived 
in sectarian terms. In addition to the UN 
mediator, this would require a multi-tiered 
diplomatic effort. 
First, Germany, the United States, and 
the other Western powers supposedly 
working with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and 
other Arab countries under the Friends of 
the Syrian People umbrella would have to 
agree on political priorities. The Western 
focus on the Islamic State has relegated the 
Geneva I principles for a political transition 
to the sidelines, raising suspicion among 
the Syrian opposition, Saudi Arabia, and Tur-
key about the West’s seriousness in ending 
Assad’s rule and four decades of Alawite 
domination over the country. Indeed, the 
US air raids against the Islamic State have 
indirectly supported Assad by targeting 
fighters who could challenge him. 
A second sphere of diplomatic efforts 
would need to deal with the aftermath 
of the nuclear negotiations with Iran. US 
officials have indicated that they intend to 
approach Tehran about regional problems 
after a final nuclear agreement is signed. 
Iran has been sending money and person-
nel to prop up the Assad regime as the Ala-
wite minority bleeds. Eventually, it might 
become too costly, and Tehran might be 
tempted to negotiate a transition that would 
preserve some of its interests and a security 
structure not wholly antagonistic to Hez-
bollah. Saudi Arabia has also been facing 
problems closer to its own borders in 
Yemen and Iraq. It might be open to a com-
promise that removes Assad but preserves a 
semblance of the state and limits chaos by 
keeping a stake for those backed by Iran in 
the system. Thus, a crucial step would be 
finding a balance of interests between Iran 
and Saudi Arabia. Syrian opposition leaders 
have indicated that they recognize that Iran 
cannot be dismissed, and that a way would 
have to be found to safeguard Tehran’s in-
terest in a future Syria. The Jordanian for-
eign minister sent a similar message when 
he told Iranian officials in Tehran in March 
that it was time to reexamine Syria and 
other issues in cold political terms despite 
the religious taint to the conflict. 
In addition, Russian backing would be 
needed to support a deal on the regional 
level. Russia wields significant influence 
within the Alawite core of Assad’s military, 
and it has continued to back the regime. 
But Russian dissatisfaction with Assad will 
grow if he fails to perform. For example, 
Moscow seems not to have been pleased 
when the regime offered virtually no con-
cessions at Syria talks held in Moscow in 
April 2015, which mostly involved Syrian 
figures handpicked by Russia who differ 
little from Assad. Thus, the time might be 
ripe to find some common ground between 
the West and Moscow on Syria and the re-
gional dimensions of the conflict, although 
Russia has made it clear that its coopera-
tion with the West in negotiating the nu-
clear deal with Iran is separate from other 
international conflicts. Only when there is 
sufficient regional and international agree-
ment would a “Geneva III” conference stand 
a reasonable chance of containing the 
chaos in Syria. 
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